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SUMMARYAND CONCLUSION 
T1zi.i paper describes in br-ief tIre Reliability and 
.kfairitainubilit~~ (R&M) Progr-ams perfornred directly by the 
reliability brurrch at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). 
T11e mnivrion asstrrunce requiremtwt.s flow down is explained. 
GSFC pm,actices for PRA, reliability prediction/fauIt tree 
am~ai~~.sis/reliability block diagram, FMEA, part stress and 
dem-acing analysis, worst case analysis, trend analysis, li~nit I@ 
iterrrs ore presented. Lesson learned a1.e sunrrnarized and 
~;.con~m~zcndations on improvement are irlentified. 
deviation from such requirements. The Safety & Mission 
Assurance organization maintains responsibility for 
verification of programmatic compliance througli strategies, 
policies, and stai~dards. Mission Support offices also provide 
institutional checks and balances." (NASA NPD 1000.0 
Section 3.2.5) The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(OSMA) "provides policy direction, functional oversight, and 
assessment for all Agency safety, reliability, maintainability, 
and quality engineering and assurance activities and scrves as 
a principal advisory resource for the Administrator and other 
senior officials on matters pertaining to safety and mission 
I INTRODUCTION success '' 
Thc NPD 8700 1 121 further defines the NASA ~ o l ~ c v  for 
The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) is a major U.S. 
laboratory for developing and operating unmanned scientific 
spacecraft. GSFC manages many of NASA's Earth 
Observation, Astronomy, and Space Physics missions, such as 
Landsat, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 
(GOES), and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). The 
implementatio~i of Reliability and Maintainability Programs at 
GSFC assure that safe, reliable, and higli-quality systems are 
delivered. 
This paper summarizes the Reliability and Maintainability 
(R&M) practices conducted by the reliability branch at NASA 
GSFC. Section 2 describes the NASA reliability policies and 
standards on mission assurance and the flow down of NASA 
policies and standards to related Goddard Mission Assurance 
Requirements docunlentation. Section 3 introduces select 
R&M activities at GSFC, including the values added to the 
mission by applying R&M activities and some real examples. 
2 NAS.4 R&M POLICIES 
The NASA Policy Directives (NPD) 1000.0 [ I ] ,  which 
scts forth the principles and identifies the specific 
rcquirenients for NASA strategic management, specifies that 
"NASA cinploys a systeni of checks and balances for effective 
it~ternal control and to ensure the successful achievement of 
missions; assigning proper levels of influence and action to 
diffcreiit organizations. Program and project management 
focuscs upon execution. Engineering maintains independent 
authority by setting technical requirements below the 
Directorate-owned top-level requiremeills and approving any 
. . . . 
safety and mission success as to "Protect the public. 
Astronauts and pilots, NASA workrorce, and high-value 
equipment and property from potential harm", to "establish 
and maintain independent lines of communications for 
unrestricted flow of infonnation conceriiing Safcty and 
Mission Assurance (SMA), risks, or other matters affecting 
the ability to meet the mission-success criteria", to "define arid 
document both SMA requirements and safety and mission 
success criteria", to "Verify and validate life-cycle 
implementation of SMA, RM, and success requirements". 
The NPD 8720.1 [3] refines the NASA R&M policy as 
"Establish, document, and implement 
( I )  System R&M design and operational performance 
requirements (qualitative and quantitative). 
(2) System maintenance concepts, including, but not 
limited to, maintenance requirements, sched~ilc, and 
responsibilities. 
(3) R&M engineering, analysis, testing, and maintenance 
activities addressing hardware, software, fimiware, 
and hu~nan elements. 
(4) Timely and continuous assessment of compliance 
with the R&M requirements aiid the continuous 
identification of areas for improvement. 
(5) Integration of R&M engineering activities with 
systems engineering, risk management, and other 
processes, assessments, and analyses including, but 
not limited to, safety, security, quality assurance, 
logistics, probabilistic risk assessment, life-cycle 
cost, configuration management, and maintenance. 
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Share R&M data and experience for use as heritage 3.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
data in support of current, follow-on, and new 
programs or projects." 
The NASA Standard 8729.1 141 for R&M provides 
"provides guidance to customers (or purchasers) and suppliers 
(or contractors) on R&M requirenlents development, design 
implementation, and evaluation." 
Figure I depicts the NASA Safety and Mission Assuraiice 
Rcquiremcnts Tree as described above. 
At Goddard, the program functional and performance 
requirements, including the mission assurance requirements 
such as reliability. maintainability and availability (RMA), are 
siimnsarized in level I requirements documents. Such RMA 
requirenierits conform to the NASA Mission Assurance 
policies and standards. The level I requirements then flow 
down to the project requiremetlts as the so called Mission 
Assurance Reqitirements (MAR) document. This paper 
summarizes R&M activities specified in this document. 
PRA is a scenario based analysis used to assess the 
probability of failure (risk) or success of a system's operation 
[5] [6]. Results provided by this risk assessment n~ethodology 
are used to make decisiotls concerning choices of 
improvetnents to the design and operation. NASA PRA is 
defined in the NPR 8705.5 as a ten step process. 
GFSC practices PRA as defined in 8705.5. A number of 
limited scope or simplified PRAs have been coiiductcd 
recently for the IBEX, LRO, and MMS missions. "Limited 
scope" entails an analysis performed only 0x1 certain phases, 
levels, or end states of interest. In some cases, the analysis is 
simplified by not including uncertaitlty analysis due to the lack 
of uncertainty data. An ongoing NASA inter-center effort is 
aimed at establishing a PRA database to advance the PRA 
practice at GSFC and other NASA centers. 
Both tile IBEX and LRO PRAs identified critical mission 
failures scenarios. The scenarios were used by the systems 
engineers to understand the possible failures and potential 
3 GSFC R&M ACTIVITIES AND EXAMPLES mitigations. In addition, tile LRO PRA estimated the failiire 
The Mission Assurance Requirements document compiles probability of the LRO minimum mission. 
NASA quality, safety, reliability and maintainability 3.2 FMEA 
requirements. The ~eliabil i ty Program Plan (RPP, also termed 
Reliability, Maintainability and Availability Program Plan in 
some circumstances) provides planning and control for the 
reliability and maintainability progran~s based upon the MAR. 
This section describes the representative reliability tasks 
presenred in MAR. 
In general, the reliability discipline shall plan and 
iniplernent a reliability program that interacts effectively with 
other project disciplines, including systems engineering, 
hardware design, and product assurance. The program shall be 
tailoi-ed to: 
a) Assure the specified reliability probability of success 
is achieved. 
b) Demonstrate that redundant functions, including 
alternative paths and work-arounds, are independent 
to the extent practicable 
c) Demonstrate that the stress applied to parts meet 
applicable derating criteria. 
d) Identify single failure items!points, their effect on the 
attainment of mission objectives, and possible safety 
degradation. 
e) Identify limited-life items and ensure that special 
precautions are taken to conserve their useful life for 
on-orbit operations. 
The GSFC reliability branch primary focus is on the 
following reliability analyses: PRA, parts stress and derating, 
reliability prediction, fault tree analysis, FMEA. This paper 
will focus on the same. Worst case analysis, trend analysis and 
limited life items are generally performed by the design 
enginccr with assistance of the reliability engineer and are 
undcr reliability branch review. These topics will not be 
covered in detail in this paper. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a 
systematic method of identifying and classifying product and 
process problems before they occur [7][8]. The FMEA process 
is part of a quality system focused on preventing defects, 
improving reliability, enhancing safety, and increasing 
customer satisfaction. The analysis is used as a "bottoms-up" 
approach to assess high risk items and the activities iindenvay 
to provide corrective actions. FMEA is also used to define 
special test considerations, quality inspectioil points, 
operational constraints, and activities necessary to mitiiniize 
failure risk. The objective of a FMEA is to look for all of the 
ways a process or product can fail and what the effect of this 
failure would be on different levels of the system. The FMEA 
determines the effect of each failure on system opcratioli atid 
identifies single point failures, ulhich are critical to mission 
success. 
To be effective, FMEAs should be performed as early in 
the design process as possible. MIL-STD-1629 states that the 
FMEA should he initiated as soon as preliminary design 
information is available at the higher system levels and 
extended to the lower levels as more information becomes 
available on the items in question. The emphasis on an early 
FMEA development ensures that issues are discovered and 
corrected as early in the design process as possible, before 
expensive redesign becomes necessary. Generally, a 
functional FMEA is done early it1 the life cycle, and revised 
with more details as the design is firmed up. Interiace FhlEAs 
are performed on all interfaces with ground equipment or 
spacecraft to hardware to ensure no damage will occur in the 
event of failures. 
Table i presents the failure mode severity categories used 
in GSFC. 
There are a number of areas wlicre GSFC is working with 
contractors to improve FMEA practices to provide better 
information to projects. 
1. For redundant coniponents, some FMEAs have 
assumed one component fails and redundancy takes 
over and concludes that there are no effects to the 
system. Based upon MIL-STD-I 629A, the better 
approach assumes both primary and redundant 
components fail at the same time and then investigate 
its effect to the system. More emphasis is being 
placed now on common cause failures. 
Software is often minimally covered in FMEAs, if at 
all. While critical software that acts as a control is 
covered through safety hazard analyses, there is still 
improvement needed in the way software is 
examined. For software failures, both the software 
response to the hardware failures (from software 
input side) and failures caused by software itself 
should be considered in the FMEA, This subject is 
currently being improved through work with NASA 
headouarters. ,~ 
3. Process FMEAs, which are a useful tool to analyze 
facilities to minimize safety hazards, mitigate 
operations risks, and improve handling processes, are 
not fully utilized to the extent feasible. 
4. The NASA method of separating criticality 1 items 
into 1, IS, and 1R and criticality 2 items into 2 and 
2R can lead to an improper categorization of failure 
modes, such as minimizing the risk of "critical" 
redundant items to "minor" criticalities. MIL-STD- 
1629A has four categories and would work better. 
GSFC is currently working on an FMEA standard that will 
take some of these lessons learned into account, in an effort to 
improve the FMEA practice. 
3.3 1Vorst Case Anulvsis /WCA) 
devices when aging, wear, fatigue and lubricant degradation 
limit their life are examined. 
3.6 Part  Stress and Derating Analysis 
Part Stress and Derating Analysis examines the 
operational stress margins for the parts. Each application of 
electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts shall 
be subjected to stress analyses for conformance with the 
anolicable deratine nuidelines. The analvses shall he 
. . - - 
performed at the most stressful values that result from 
specified performance and environmental requirements (e.g., 
temperature and voltage) on the assembly or part. GSFC uses 
INST-EEE-002 [9] as the part stress and derating standard. 
Part stress and derating analysis is a preveirtive approach 
and should he performed before parts are procured. Some 
failures can be screened and prevented during design process. 
In one incident, two 12V rated capacitors were misused in 
18V circuitry and were not screened by proper part stress and 
derating analysis. The two capacitors exploded after the 
circuihy was powered on and damaged the board. Measures 
are being taken to prevent such incidences from occurring in 
the future. 
3.7 Reliability Prediction /Fault Tree Analysis I Reliability 
Block Diagram 
The GSFC reliability prediction modelsiestimates system 
or mission reliability utilizing reliability block diagram (RBD) 
and fault tree (FT). The RBD and FT analyses normally 
remains at the component (card) level hut may vary to 
accommodate the failure rate availability at a higher level 
(such as the failure rate of a gyro may be available from 
heritage data); or address the need to model tlie lower level 
redundancy or critical component (such as sub-card level 
, , 
redundancy or a switch which controls the redundant cards) 
Th? WCA examines the possible worst situation that may 
~h~ key to the success ofreliability is to obtain 
apply to the critical missioll components (FMEA category 1 the basic event failure rates. GSFC iitilizes the following 
and 2) and demonstrates the adequacy of margin in the design sources of failure data: Derformance of similar eleillcnts 
of electronic and electrical circuits, optics, and (heritage data), test data, iandbook data (MIL-WDBK-217F, 
electromechanical and mechanical items. This analysis was failure rates from the ~ ~ l i ~ h i l i ~ ~  information ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ i ~  center 
normally cotnpleted by design engineer and reviewed by (RIAC), or equivalent). ~u~ to the ullique nature of NASA 
reliability engineer at GSFC. space missions (almost every system is the prototype of its 
~ - 
1.4 h n d  A~al\~.ris  kind, and failed items are not available for examination, 
~ ~ ~~ ~- ~~ ~ 2 ~ ~ -  
although the telemetry data can provide limited diagnostic 
Trend Analysis monitors parameters on assemblies and information), heritage data and test data are not alwavs 
. . - 
subsystems tl~rougl~out the normal test program that relate to available. GSFC reliability predictioti often depends heaviy 
performance stability (any deviations from the nominal that on the of handhook failure data, especially MIL-HDBK- 
could indicate trends), and coordinates results with design and 217F2 data [101, 
operational personnel. The Integration & Test (I&T) engineer The MIL-HDBK-217F2 defines two methods, namely 
~iormally performs this analysis at GSFC. 
"part stress analysis" and "parts count", to estimate the failure 
3.5 Linzited Lifr Items rate of an individual part and calculate the failure rate of a 
card by summing up failure rates of all parts in that card (any 
The Limited Life Items defines and tracks the selection, in.card redundancy should be modeled in the FT), 
use and wear of limited-life items, such as fuel and propellant, The "part stress analysis" method assumes a base failure 
and tlie impact on mission operations. Limited-life items rate for the part and then correlates the failure rate part's 
consider ihe affects of atomic oxygen, solar radiation, shelf- functional characteristics, quality lt v e l  and stresses applied. 
life, extreme temperatures, thermal cycling, wear and fatigue; Stresses includes electrical (current, voltage, etc) arid 
meclvanisms such as seals, bearings, valves, actuators and scan envirolllnental stresses (e,g, 
environment such as ground, space). This niethod requires 
detailed information and is applicable during the later design 
phase when actual hardware and circuits designs are available. 
The "parts count" method determines tlie part failure rate 
based upon the base failure rate, the quality level of the past, 
and the application environment. The component failure rate is 
the sum of all past failure rates. This method is applicable 
during the early design phase and during proposal formulation. 
Temperature is one of the major factors that influence 
EEE (Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical) part 
failure rate. GSFC practices show that, in general, every 10 *C 
temperature increase doubles the failure rate. The failure rate 
used iil "parts coutit" method is roughly equivalent to the 
1. Collaborations with other NASA centers for better, 
more applicable failure data. 
2. increased involvement at the early stage in the life 
cycle. 
3. More profound use of I'RA during the life cycle. 
4. Better incorporation of software reliability and 
maintainability. 
As R&M techniques are further refined and better data is 
collected to more accurately predict mission lifetimes, 
reliability suppost will continue to he of great use to GSFC 
missions. 
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